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letions, the statute read: "A court of equity
has jurisdiction over the ... visitation ...
ofa child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the
court may . . . (4) Determine who shall
have visitation rights to a child;" MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §
3-602 (a) (1976). The court stated: "On its
face, therefore, section 3-604 (a) (4), prior
to the 1981 amendment, constituted the
broadest possible grant of authority to
courts to determine who shall be awarded
visitation rights." Evans v. Evans, 302
Md. at 339, 488 A.2d at 159.
The court then addressed the appellee's
contention that jurisdiction over visitation
must be construed narrowly in view of the
1981 amendment specifically providing
for grandparent's visitation rights. The
basis for the appellee's argument was that
the inclusion of a statutory provision specifically addressed to the visitation rights
of grandparents was a legislative recognition of the need to protect these rights. In
rejecting their argument, the court of appeals noted a long line of case law previously recognizing the right of grandparents
to custody and visitation rights. Powers v.
Hadden, 30 Md. App. 577, 353 A.2d 641
(1938).
The thrust of the court's reasoning, however, seems to turn on its examination of
the legislative history of the 1981 amendment to Section 3-602 (a) (4). A four year
effort had been present in the Maryland
Legislature to enact legislation to guarantee
visitation rights to grandparents. Evans,
302 Md. at 339-43, 408 A.2d at 159-61.
However these measures were repeatedly
defeated on the grounds that the existing
law adequately provided these rights.
The court agreed with the analysis of a
1984 decision by the court of appeals,
Skeens v. Paterno, 60 Md. App. 48, 480
A.2d 820(1984), wherein that court stated:
"The legislative history contains no indication that the bill was intended as a limitation on grandparental visitation or on
anyone else's visitation - in other contexts ... " Id at 60-61, 480 A.2d at 826.
The court's decision in Evans reaffirms
the longstanding test which has governed
Maryland custody and visitation cases,
namely, what is in the best interests of the
child. See Elza v. Elza, 300 Md. 51,475
A.2d 1180 (1984); Hild v. Hild, 221 Md.
349,157 A.2d442 (1960); Carterv. Carter,
156 Md. 500, 144 A. 490 (1929). Evans
makes it clear that the Maryland courts
have considerable discretion in determining who shall be awarded child visitation
rights, and explicitly are not limited to natural or adoptive parents or grandparents.
-M. Tracy Neuhauser
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u.s. v. Johns: THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION ONE STEP FURTHER
The Supreme Court through Justice
O'Connor in a 7-2 decision extended the
rule of law of United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798 (1982), which stated that once
police officers have probable cause to
search a lawfully stopped vehicle, they
may open and search closed containers
found within the vehicle that may conceal
the object of their search. In United States
v. Johns, 105 S.Ct. 881 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a search is not unreasonable, and therefore not violative of
the fourth amendment, "merely" because
the warrantless search of closed containers
takes place several days after the containers are removed from the vehicles.
In the course of an investigation of drug
smuggling operations, custom agents by
airborne and surface surveillance observed
the rendezvous between several pickup
trucks and an airplane at a remote airstrip
50 miles from the Mexican border. At
trial the surface agents stated that they
could not see what transpired, but were

told by airborne units that the trucks approached and parked near the small plane.
The officers closed in on the trucks, observed an individual covering the containers with a blanket, and smelled the odor
of marihuana. In the back of the trucks
were containers wrapped in dark green
plastic and sealed with tape. The respondents were then arrested. Neither the containers nor the trucks were searched at the
scene but instead they were taken to the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
headquarters. The containers were unloaded from the trucks and placed in a
DEA warehouse; three days later a warrantless search revealed the marihuana.
At trial the respondents were successful
in suppressing the evidence, and this was
affirmed by the court of appeals, United
States v. Johns, 707 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1983).
The Court summarily disposed of the
respondents first contention that the officer's probable cause to suspect contraband
went to the containers not the vehicles.
This distinction is important; if probable
cause went to the containers, the rule in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977), would invalidate the warrantless
search as outside of the automobile exception first set forth in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), but if the
probable cause went to the vehicle, the·
only issue is whether the rule in Ross,
should apply to a three day delay in an
otherwise lawful search. The Court did
not disturb the findings of fact of the
lower court and agreed that the officers
had probable cause that not only the packages, but also the vehicle contained the
drugs. See United States v. Johns, 707 F.2d
1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1983).
The Court appeared to break the case
into two steps. First, that Ross, allowed
police officers to open and search closed
containers found in the execution of a
warrantless automobile search. Second,
that Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), allowed vehicle searches at the police station that could have taken place at
the place of the vehicle stop. Therefore,
the Court simply stated, "as the Government was entitled to seize the packages
and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, we conclude that
the warrantless search three days later ...
was reasonable .... " Johns, 105 S.Ct. at
887.
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ute would provide a remedy to Adler since
he made the report to the employer. Adoption of a statute similar to those in Michigan and Connecticut would not provide a
remedy, since he did not report his suspicions to a public body; however, the
statute could represent the clear mandate
of public policy that is required by Adler.
Further, the Michigan statute does not require that the employee actually report
the alleged violation to a public body, but
only that his discharge occurred and he
"was about to report" the suspected violation. 19 The employee does not bear the
burden of pleading the actual violation of
law.
Arguments against enactment of a
Whistleblowers' statute include the basic
business management position that a business cannot properly or profitably operate if every employee has the right to second guess the legality and/or morality of
all management decisions. Simply stated,
an employee who thinks that his employer
is acting illegally should be so dissatisfied
that he should terminate his employment
unilaterally. Ideally, if an employee suspects that the business is not operating
legally, he should not want to be employed by that business. Realistically, financial considerations of an individual
employee may not allow him the luxury
of such idealism. At the same time, an
employee who has reported to supervisors
that he believes that illegal activities are
taking place must realize the risk that he
is taking and expect that supervisors may
question his loyalty to the employer.
The employee, however, deserves the
protection of a Whistleblowers' statute
because job security is valuable, particularly when unemployment is high. Termination may leave the employee with
depressed job prospects when his only
failing was the refusal to ignore what reasonably appeared to him to be illegal
practices of his employer. With the demand for less government, the question
arises of whether wrongful discharge or
a Whistleblowers' statute infuse unnecessary governmental interference with private industry. According to Adler, that
question is answered by the balancing of
the three interests: individual, business
and society. The interest of society in enforcement ofits criminal laws may tip the
scale in favor of the enactment of a Maryland Whistleblowers' statute.
Notes
lWrongful discharge has been called interchangeably wrongful, abusive or retaliatory discharge.
Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,
36, 432 A.2d 464 n. 2 (1981).
2The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A
Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of
the 80's, 40 BUS. LAW. 1 (1984).

lRecognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge in Maryland, 10 U. BALT. L. REV. 257

(1981).
4291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981).
5291 Md. at 47, 432 A.2d at 473.
6291 Md. 31,432 A.2d 464 (1981).
7MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 39(a) (1979); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 89, § 43 (1979); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 8-105, 8-401
(1984); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 15-605
(1983).
sAdler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31,
432 A.2d 464 (1981).
9MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1979).
10291 Md. at 42, 432 A.2d at 470.
"291 Md. 31,432 A.2d 464 (1981).
12111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982).
13 111 Ill. App. 3d at 508, 444 N.E.2d at 592 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill.
2d 124, 133, 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1981».
14 291 Md. at 45, 432 A.2d at 472.
15575 F. Supp. 715 (D. Md. 1983).
16575 F. Supp. at 717.
l7CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51M (West
Supp. 1985); MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 15.361-369 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 26 §§ 831-840 (Supp. 1984).
IsMICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.363 (West
Supp. 1985).
19MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.363 (West
Supp. 1985).
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The dissent of Justice Brennan, with
whom Justice Marshall joined, stressed
that the delay in the search removes any
exigency that may impair reasonable efforts to obtain a warrant. Accordingly,
the dissent insisted that there lacked any
of the justifications for not adhering to
the fourteenth amendment's warrant requirement.
The Court's decision is dangerous because it shows a total disregard for that
tenuous connection between rules and their
justifications. The automobile exception
was based on narrow justifications; the
impracticality of obtaining a warrant on
something as mobile as a vehicle, the diminished expectation of privacy, and the safety
of law enforcement officers. But once a
closed container is taken from the automobile and placed in a warehouse, those justifications have evaporated. Departing from
the established justifications makes it easier
for future courts to make further unsupported extensions, which jeopardize the
fourteenth and fourth amendments' protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
In addition, by not narrowly applying
the warrant requirement, the Court runs
the risk that otherwise diligent police officers will momentarily become unobservant so that the stated focus of the
search will be the vehicle, and not the
package contained within the vehicle.
This momentary lapse removes the search
from United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1 (1977) which states that if the suspicion
is focused on the closed container, a warrant is required, and puts it within United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). This
becomes an unwise rule when it rewards
otherwise trivial differences in police surveillance by dispensing with the warrant
requirement. A better position would be to
resist the temptation to extend the automobile exception, and limit the exceptions to
the warrant requirement to those within
the ambit of the original justifications.

-Michael Burgoyne
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